

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 165855

ORIGIN SS-25

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DRAFTED BY PM/NPP:GGOPLINGER:JMM

APPROVED BY S/AS:AMBASSADOR SMITH

S/AS - MR. FARLEY

OES/NET - MR. DEVINE

S/P - MR. KAHAN

ERDA - MR. SEIVERING

T - DR. NYE

ACDA - MR. VAN DOREN

S/S-O: LRMACFARLANE

-----080268 160026Z /20

P 152238Z JUL 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

SECRET STATE 165855

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS:TECH, PARM, MNUC, FR

SUBJECT: NON-PROLIFERATION EXPERTS MEETING

FOLLOWING IS U.S. SUGGESTED REVISION OF GIRAUD DRAFT,
BEGINNING WITH PARAGRAPH 3.

QUOTE

3. THAT PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, WHICH ACCORDING TO THE
DECISIONS REACHED AT LONDON WAS TO BE COMPLETED BY JULY 9,
IS PRESENTED IN WHAT FOLLOWS.

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4. ALL THE DELEGATIONS RECOGNIZE THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING AND CONSTANTLY IMPROVING IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND OF SUBJECTING THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO SUCH SAFEGUARDS AND OTHER AGREED NORMS. SOME CONSIDER THAT IN THE FUTURE, NUCLEAR EXPORT COMMITMENTS TO NON-NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE STATES THAT HAVE PLACED THEIR ENTIRE FUEL CYCLE UNDER SUCH SAFEGUARDS. SOME DELEGATIONS ALSO BELIEVE

THAT THE STORAGE, ALTERATION, AND REPROCESSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL SUPPLIED IN THE FUTURE, OR GENERATED IN REACTORS SUPPLIED IN THE FUTURE, SHOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY WITH THE SUPPLIER'S CONSENT. OTHERS CONSIDER THAT SUCH COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE OBTAINED BY PERSUASION RATHER THAN AS CONDITIONS OF SUPPLY.

5. ALL THE DELEGATIONS CONSIDER THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES REDUCING THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION REQUIRES THAT THE VARIOUS CONSUMER COUNTRIES FEEL ASSURED OF SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR FUEL TO SATISFY THEIR NEEDS UNDER ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY SATISFACTORY CONDITIONS OF SUPPLY.

6. HOWEVER, CONCERNS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF WORLD URANIUM RESERVES. DIFFICULTIES IN EXPLOITING URANIUM RESERVES, AND UNCERTAINTIES WITH RESPECT TO EXPORT CONDITIONS, CAST UNCERTAINTY ON THEIR AVAILABILITY TO CONSUMERS. THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW CONCERNING POTENTIAL NEW RESERVES, COSTS OF EXPLOITATION, AND FUTURE WORLD DEMAND. THE PARTIES THEREFORE PROPOSE TO STUDY JOINTLY VARIOUS MEANS OF INCREASING KNOWN RESERVES, AND OF FACILITATING ACCESS TO URANIUM FOR THE BENEFIT OF CONSUMERS. (SEE ITEM 1B OF THE PROGRAM.)

7. THEY ALSO PROPOSE TO STUDY HOW USERS OF ENRICHED SECRET

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URANIUM COULD BE ASSURED OF HAVING THEIR NEEDS MET. CONSUMERS SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THERE WILL BE NO WORLD SHORTAGE, AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY ACCESS THROUGH SUCH MEANS AS FREEDOM OF CHOICE BETWEEN VARIOUS SUPPLIES. (SEE ITEM 2A OF THE PROGRAM) - -

8. IN ADDITION, IN PLANNING THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW ENRICHING CAPACITY, DUE ACCOUNT OUGHT TO BE TAKEN OF THE NEED TO AVOID ENCOURAGING DISSEMINATION OF THE TECHNOLOGIES MOST DANGEROUS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PROLIFERATION. A COMPARISON OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGIES FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW WOULD BE USEFUL (SEE ITEM 2B.) FURTHERMORE, THE AVAILABILITY AND STOCKPILING OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SHOULD BE STRICTLY REGULATED AND CONTROLLED.

9. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO SEE IF MULTINATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS COULD BE ESTABLISHED TO GUARANTEE URANIUM OR ENRICHED URANIUM SUPPLIES IN THE EVENT OF A SUDDEN BREAK IN SUPPLIES. (SEE ITEM 3.)

10. THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IS CURRENTLY ORGANIZED AROUND URANIUM AS THE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND REQUIRES

STORAGE OF LONG-TERM RADIOACTIVE WASTE EITHER IN THE FORM
OF SPENT FUEL OR AFTER REPROCESSING OF THE IRRADIATED
FUELS, AND PROPER HANDLING OF THE WASTE. CHEMICAL
REPROCESSING OF SPENT FUEL MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO RECOVER

URANIUM AS WELL AS PLUTONIUM. THE RESULT IS A SIGNIFI-
CANT INCREASE IN THE ENERGY MADE AVAILABLE IF THE PLU-
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REPROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM RECYCLE.

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11. ALL THE DELEGATIONS CONSIDER THAT THE RISK OF PRO-
LIFERATION WILL BE SMALLER IF THE DISSEMINATION OF PLU-
TONIUM CAN BE PREVENTED. BUT NO AGREEMENT HAS BEEN
REACHED YET ON THE BEST WAY OF DEVELOPING NUCLEAR ENERGY
WHILE PREVENTING THE DISSEMINATION OF PLUTONIUM.

12. SOME COUNTRIES CONSIDER THAT THE EXPANSION OF
COMMERCIAL-SCALE REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE
AVOIDED UNTIL INTERESTED NATIONS HAVE CARRIED OUT
THOROUGH STUDIES IN THREE AREAS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-
TERM RETRIEVABLE OR TERMINAL STORAGE OF UNSEPARATED
IRRADIATED FUELS; TECHNOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
TO REDUCE THE PROLIFERATION RISKS OF THE SEPARATION AND
USE OF PLUTONIUM, SUCH AS MULTINATIONAL FUEL CENTERS; AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES TO INCREASE THE ENERGY WHICH
CAN BE EXTRACTED FROM NUCLEAR MATERIALS WITHOUT PLUTONIUM
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LATTER POINT: E.G., INCREASE THE COMBUSTION RATE OF
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WHICH WOULD NOT MAKE PLUTONIUM AVAILABLE.

13. OTHER COUNTRIES BELIEVE THAT THE EXPANSION OF REPRO-
CESSING ACTIVITIES SHOULD GO FORWARD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
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SIDERATIONS; IT IS ARGUED THAT AT PRESENT WE HAVE NOT YET
DEMONSTRATED TECHNIQUES TO STORE IRRADIATED FUELS OVER
THE LONG-TERM; IT IS UNCERTAIN THAT WE WILL SUCCEED, AND
PROVISIONAL STORAGE OF THOSE FUELS -- FOR WHICH THE
INDUSTRY IS NOT CURRENTLY EQUIPPED -- INCREASES THE RISKS
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IS THAT CONFIRMED URANIUM RESERVES MAY NOT PERMIT NUCLEAR
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT TO THE EXTENT NEEDED IF THE URANIUM

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AND PLUTONIUM WHICH COULD BE RECYCLED ARE WASTED. THESE COUNTRIES BELIEVE THAT THE ALTERNATIVES PROPOSED FOR STUDY ARE NOT NEW, AND THAT THEIR LIMITS CAN BE QUICKLY DEFINED. THEY CONSIDER THAT THESE IDEAS WOULD UPSET EXISTING NUCLEAR CAPACITY, THAT THEIR ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ARE UNFORESEEABLE BUT MAY BE EXTREME, AND THAT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ENERGY SUPPLIES. MORE-

OVER, THE MEASURES THAT WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW DO NOT EXCLUDE THE USE OF OTHER SENSITIVE MATERIALS LIKE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND URANIUM 233 -- OR EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF PLUTONIUM

14. DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES, ALL DELEGATIONS ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT A COMPARITIVE STUDY SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT TO ANALYZE EACH OF THE ALTERNATIVES PROPOSED TO DETERMINE ITS ABILITY TO MEET ENERGY NEEDS AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION (SEE ITEMS 6, 7, 8, 1A 1D, 5). THEY ALSO AGREE THAT CERTAIN MEASURES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL STUDY TO MAXIMIZE THE PREVENTION OF THE DISSEMINATION OF PLUTONIUM (SEE ITEM 4). THESE MEASURES INCLUDE: LIMITING THE NUMBER OF REPROCESSING PLANTS AND ENSURING THAT THEY ARE SITUATED IN CAREFULLY CHOSEN LOCATIONS; ENSURING THAT REPROCESSING PLANTS MEET ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS; ENSURING THAT THEY ARE PLACED UNDER APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS; ENSURING THAT PLUTONIUM IS NOT EXTRACTED IN EXCESS OF THE AMOUNTS JUSTIFIED; ENSURING THAT ANY TEMPORARY STORAGE OF SEPARATED PLUTONIUM WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED TAKES PLACE IN REPROCESSING PLANTS OR IN APPROPRIATE CENTERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL; ENSURING THAT SEPARATED PLUTONIUM IS STORED ONLY IN REPROCESSING PLANTS OR IN APPROPRIATE CENTERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL; AND ENSURING THAT PLUTONIUM IS TRANSPORTED ONLY IN FORMS WHICH MAKE ITS RECOVERY EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF POSSIBLE AS DIFFICULT AS WHEN STARTING WITH IRRADIATED FUELS.

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15. WITH RESPECT TO POINTS ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS YET TO BE REACHED, ALL THE COUNTRIES COULD PROCEED TO A MORE DETAILED DEBATE, IN A SPIRIT OF OBJECTIVITY, WITH MUTUAL RESPECT FOR ONE ANOTHER'S CHOICES AND DECISIONS, WITH CONSULTATION TO WORK OUT MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS WHEN DIFFERENT APPROACHES AFFECT EXISTING NATIONAL

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APPROVED BY: OES/NET: LVNOSENZO
T/D-ED MCGAFFIGAN
S/S-TGMARTIN

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S E C R E T STATE 165855

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 165855 ACTON PARIS JULY 15.

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Sent Date: 15-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Subject: NON-PROLIFERATION EXPERTS MEETING FOLLOWING IS U.S. SUGGESTED REVISION OF GIRAUD DRAFT, BEGINNING WITH PARAGRAPH 3.
TAGS: TECH, PARM, MNUC, FR, US
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